Q: Can a verbal lease agreement stand for a non-spouse of 30 years after the partner dies?
A man made a verbal commitment to his non-martial spouse of 30 years to allow her to live in his home that is willed to his daughter until she dies, free of charge. The daughter verbally agreed to this agreement with her father, but is now reneging. She is requiring the surviving non-marital spouse to pay property taxes and utilities. His trust is old, completed in 2001. They did keep their money separate. He paid the operational costs of the home because she has a very small pension and social security. She not looking for a spilt in the estate, just the habitation of the home.
Could the Marvin vs Marvin case apply in this instance? Does she have any rights at all?
Thank you in advance for the help!
A:
A good theory of law that would likely apply is what is called "equitable estoppel."
"The venerable doctrine of equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, which rests firmly upon a foundation of conscience and fair dealing, [fn. omitted] finds its classical statement in the words of Lord Denman: [T]he rule of law is clear, that, where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is [precluded] from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. . . .' [Citation.]" ( City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 488 [91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423] ( Mansell); see Evid. Code, § 623.)
Evidence Code section 623, which codifies the doctrine, provides, "Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it." (See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 384 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 655, 73 P.3d 517] [recognizing codification].)
Another great theory in this case would be promissory estoppel. See Restatement Second of Contracts § 90.
Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
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